During your post-turkey tryptophan coma, below is a breakdown on the arm-twisting Title IX rulings and litigation setting legal precedence.
Title VII v Title IX
Title VII is a federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, as well as race, color, national origin and religion. Title IX is a federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in education, covering all staff and students in any educational institution or program that receives federal funds.
Bostock v Clayton County is a Title VII case cited throughout all government agencies as a result of the Biden Administration Announcement on Advancing Equity Through the Federal Government. The Administration's only flaw in their diabolical scheme is you can not apply Title VII to Title IX. Bostock applies to neither Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act nor Title IX, or any other non-Title VII statute!
How do we know that? The Neese Opinion and Order, referenced below, says it on page eight laying out reasoning through page twelve.
Title IX
In the case, Franciscan Alliance v Becca, two Texas physicians filed lawsuits against the United States Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]. This case was based on arm-twisting that began under the Obama Administration in May of 2016.
Under section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) physicians would be forced to perform body modifying and life altering
surgical procedures on those suffering from gender dysphoria. The physicians argued this would create
irreversible infertility and irrepressible harm to their patients.
Because the litigation process is slow, many twists and turns have played out in real-time as this case has been argued since 2016, when originally filed.
The take away here is this, the merits are Franciscan Alliance Administrative Procedures Act (APA) claim is moot, its Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) claim is not.
What Does That Mean?
In the opinion it reads as follows on page 12:
"Title IX reads no person "shall on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance [except as provided throughout the statute]. 20 U. S. C. 1681(a). Because Title IX does not define "on the basis of sex," the Court must construe the phrase."6
Pay attention to the footnote 6 here:
"Congress enacted Title IX 1972. 20 U.S.C. 1681. At that time "sex" was commonly understood to refer to physiological differences between men and women ---- particularly with respect to reproductive function. See e.g., Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1187 (1976) ("The property or quality by which organisms are classified by reproductive functions.)"; Sex WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (1971) ("The sum of the morphological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction with its concominant genetic segregation and recombination which underlie most evolutionary change. . . .)"; Sex, 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 578 (1961) ("The sum of those differences in the structure and function in the reproductive organs on the grounds on which are beings are distinguished male and female, and of the other physiological differences consequent on these.)". The court replies on the same definitions of "sex" in this case."
- "Categorizing people based on their genitalia" being a common mantra of those within the gender spectrum camp, on the basis of reproductive function, biological chromosomal characteristics xx and xy, the physiological differences between male and female, and traditional meaning/intent of sex under Title IX seems irrefutable here.
Footnote 6 goes on:
"Both parties proceed with the assumption that "sex" as used in Title IX, means biological. See e.g., ECF 47 at 8, 13; ECF No. 56 at 25 & n. 5, (But "Defendants do not concede that this interpretation of 'sex' is correct."). ef. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746-47. ("We agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex"); Grimm, 972 F.3d at 632 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)("As several sources make clear, the term 'sex' in this context must be understood as referring to the traditional biological indicators that distinguish a male from a female, not the persons internal sense of being male or female, or their outward presentation of that internally felt sense.") Parties only dispute whether Title IX's prohibition of discrimination "on the basis of sex" prohibits discrimination on the basis of *SOGI."
* Sexual orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI)
- It continues further, into page 13 of footnote 6, the Department of Education overreach that would have to be and is being litigated separately [in U.S. District Court for Southern Ohio]:
"Notably, other federal agencies---including the Department of Education---have proposed regulations redefining "sex" in Title IX to include "sexual orientation" and "gender identity." See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 87 Fed. Reg. 41390, 41391 (July 12, 2022). Those regulations are not an issue here and the court does not opine on their validity or correctness of their interpretation."
How does the Department of Health and Human Services have the legal authority to redefine or reinterpret a long standing legal doctrine? It doesn't!
Ohioans, how does the Ohio Department of Education, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Local School Board, or Local District Superintendents have the legal authority to redefine or reinterpret Title IX as it applies to Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance?
IT DOESN'T!
Stay focused Ohio . . .
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